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Abstract—In this paper, we show new smart attacks which were
not dealt with in the solutions proposed recently. We focus on
the Medium Access Control (MAC), particularly the IEEE 802.11
and we study some hidden vulnerabilities based on the control
packets. The malicious nodes can exploit these vulnerabilities to
reduce the network’s performance, to disturb the monitoring,
routing processes and to escape the Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). Furthermore, we show how vulnerabilities can be exploited
and how these attacks can be implemented by the attacker. More-
over, attacks’ algorithms and the security analysis are presented.
We investigate on the effect of these attacks with the simulations
and the experimentations. The simulations’ results and their
analysis illustrate the negative impact of these attacks on the
network. In addition, the experimentation results demonstrate the
feasibility to real exploitation of these attacks and they confirm
the simulation’s results.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing popularity of MANETs, it is reasonable
to expect that users will demand a high security level for them.
Many recent works proposed a security solution based on the
monitoring mechanisms such as: Watchdog mechanism [5] and
others [6] [1]. The monitoring process is defined as the set of
actions that are useful to supervise the behaviour of nodes.
These actions depend on the services we want to monitor
(routing, authentication, integrity, etc). The monitoring process
is a part of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Therefore,
without any IDS of misbehaving nodes, it has been shown that
the results of misbehaviour have shown that they dramatically
decreased the performance of the network [?] and produced the
denial of service (DoS). However, the IDS solutions proposed
for MANETs [5] [6] are not efficient for the certain hidden
vulnerabilities, particularly the cross-layer attacks. These at-
tacks are based on the MAC layer and propagate to the upper
layer. Some researchers already studied MAC vulnerabilities
and the cross-layer attacks [3] [2], but they only focused on
the back-off, DIFS and SIFS manipulations. In this work, we
do not focus on the back-off vulnerability, but we show new
MAC layer’ vulnerabilities based on the packet control format
and on the new challenge for IDS that is the detection of these
smart attacks.
The contribution of this work consists on the illustration of
the new hidden vulnerabilities at the MAC layer, particularly
the control packets which have a negative impact on the
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network’s performance. These vulnerabilities are different than
the problem of false RTS [4]. However, in our case we focus
on the control packets format vulnerabilities and the differ-
ent attacks which can be exploited against the network and
particularly the monitoring process. Furthermore, we discuss
the difficulty to detect the attackers and the attacks based on
the CTS and ACK packets. Moreover, we show the impact of
the attacks on the network and we discuss their effect on the
monitoring process based on the forwarding approach (Watch-
dog mechanism [5]). The attackers’ goals can be focused on
the network’s performance, that means they want to disturb
the monitoring process to punish the nodes that well-behave
by reducing their reputation. The attacks’ implementation and
their simulations are presented. In addition, we do not limited
to the simulations’ result, but the real experimentations are
done and the obtained results confirm the simulations’ results.
Almost all works in the literature propose only analytical
analyses and/or simulations rare are those which implement
their proposals for a security issues in a testbed. In spite of
the problems related to the hardware and system, our initiative
to implement our proposals deserves to be introduced into this
paper and constitutes a beginning with other experiments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we present the hidden vulnerabilities with RTS-CTS hand-
shake protocol: control packets format vulnerabilities, the false
CTS and the false packet’s validation based on the false
ACK are illustrated. In section 3, we show the impact of
these attacks on the network with the simulations. The fourth
section is devoted to the experimentations’ results and to their
analysis. In section 5, we propose a security analysis. The last
section is the conclusion and we also present our future works.
II. HIDDEN VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we illustrate the hidden vulnerabilities at
the MAC layer which have a negative impact on the moni-
toring mechanism. We show how these vulnerabilities may be
exploited by the attackers.
A. The RTS-CTS handshake mechanism
The RTS-CTS mechanism is used to avoid the hidden node’s
problem [7]. The basic idea of the RTS-CTS mechanism
consists in transmitting the RTS packet from the sender to
the receiver node. When the receiver node receives the RTS
packet, it answers by the CTS packet, in order to inform its
neighbours about the transmission duration and to avoid the
hidden nodes’ problem. As illustrated in figure 1(a), node C
overhears the RTS packet and defers its own transmissions by
the NAV(RTS). So, the NAV (Network Allocator Vector) is the
transmission duration which is calculated by sender node A.
NAV (RTS) = 3.TSIFS + TCTS + TDATA + TACK (1)
where TCTS , TDATA and TACK are the propagation times of
transmission packets CTS, DATA and ACK respectively. The
TSIFS is the Short InerFrame Spacing 1.
Node D defers its own transmission when it receives the
CTS packet with NAV(CTS) in the duration packet field, as
illustrated in figure 1(a). The NAV(CTS) is calculated by
receiver node B, and is based on the NAV(RTS) in the RTS
packet
NAV (CTS) = NAV (RTS)− (TSIFS + TCTS) (2)
Sender node A does not start the transmission of the data
before it receives the CTS packet. The receiver node answers
by the ACK packet, once it has received the DATA packet
correctly, as indicated in figure 1(b).
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The RTS-CTS mechanism
B. Control packets’ format vulnerabilities
Figure 2 shows the RTS, CTS and ACK packets’ format
[8]. We notice that, in order to optimize the packets’ size, the
CTS and ACK packets do not contain the source address of
the transmitter node. However, with an RTS/CTS mechanism,
when the node sends the RTS packet to the destination node,
all nodes in its transmission range become silent except the
destination one, that will answer by CTS without its address
in the packet. When the sender node receives the CTS packet,
it deduces that the packet is from the destination node without
checking the address (identity) of the source node, that sends
the CTS. In IEEE 802.11, the node cannot communicate
with more than one node at the same time [8]. Furthermore,
the ACK packet cannot be authenticated by the node which
receives it. The malicious nodes can exploit this vulnerability
by producing some attacks without being identified by the IDS.
The attacker can generate the false RTS in order to block
its neighbours. According to the RTS packet format, many
solutions may be proposed to detect this attack, like the RTS
1In IEEE 802.11, the TSIFS = 10us
validation proposed in [4]. However, this solution is limited to
the RTS packet and cannot avoid the problem. For example,
the attacker can only generate the false CTS and sophisticated
false ACK, in order to disturb the network’s operation. The
scenario of these attacks is explained hereinafter.
Fig. 2. The RTS, CTS and ACK packets’ format
C. Virtual jamming based on the false CTS
The false CTS packet can be generated by the attacker, in
order to create a false blocking situation (virtual jamming)
[4]. When the nodes in the transmission range of the attacker
node receive a false CTS packet, they are futilely blocked
during the presumed transmission duration NAV(CTS), even if
they did not receive the RTS packet (it considers itself as a
hidden node). The false CTS attack can block the nodes in
the transmission range of the attacker but it can also block
the nodes outside the transmission range of the attacker and
inside the interference range of EIFS (Extended Inter-Frame
Spaces)2 [8]. That means that the nodes receive a false CTS
but cannot decode it correctly. We can say that the impact
of this attack is not limited to the transmission range of the
attacker node but is extended to its interference range. Another
important problem with this attack is that even if the monitor
node detects the false CTS, it is not able to detect the attacker
according to the packet format’s vulnerability. That means that
the attacker can easily escape the punishment procedure, for
example, by reducing its trust level or reputation level. That’s
why the attacker node can easily exploit this vulnerability and
frequently attack its neighbors.
In figure 3 we show the false CTS attack algorithm as flow
chart. We notice that the attacker checks if the NAV matches
zero, then, it will check the channel status. If the channel is
busy, it will wait for DIFS + Backoff , otherwise it will
create the false CTS with a false destination address and start
the attack.
D. False packet validation based on the false ACK
The false ACK packet can be exploited by the attacker, in
order to disturb the network’s operation such as the routing
process or the monitoring mechanism, etc. The false ACK
attack cannot be detected and the negative impact is more
2The EIFS is estimated at 364µs when using a 1 Mbps channel bit rate
Fig. 3. The false CTS flow chart
significant. The idea consists in validating the packet of the
sender although the packet is not received correctly by the
receiver node. The impact of this false validation of the packet
is that the sender will not retransmit the packet because it
received the ACK packet.
Fig. 4. The false ACK disturbs the monitoring process
Figure 4 illustrates the scenario of the false ACK. Node
A wants to send a packet to node B, node M is an attacker
located in the transmission ranges of node A and node B.
Node M needs to know the address of nodes A and B and
also needs to know the NAV(RTS) or NAV(CTS) to create
this attack. When node M overhears the RTS packet, it gets
the address of nodes A and B and the NAV(RTS). According
to the NAV(RTS) or NAV(CTS), node M can determine the
time Tcoll it will start the attack. The attack is divided into
two parts. In the first part, the attacker sends the packet to
node B at Tcoll, in order to create a collision at node B. The
Tcoll is the random value in the interval [Bmin, Bmax] where{
Bmin =
NAV (CTS)−(TACK+TSIF S)
2
Bmax = NAV (CTS)− (TACK + TSIFS + TJAM )
where TJAM is the propagation time of the packet which
will create the collision at node B. Generally, this packet has
a small size, like the ACK or CTS packets. Then, TJAM
is equivalent to TACK or TCTS . The reason why we chose
a random value for Tcoll is that we wanted to escape any
anomaly detection by the monitor node (an IDS). In the
second part, the attacker sends the false ACK to node A
at the time Tvalide. This duration is calculated as follows:
Tvalide = NAV (CTS)− TACK − TSIFS .
When sender node A receives the ACK packet before a
certain timeout TOut2, it does not realize the presence of
any anomaly or false ACK packet. TOut2 is the maximum
time between the time when the sender node starts to transmit
DATA and the reception of the ACK packet. The TOut2 is
calculated as follows:
TOut2 = TDATA + MPD + TSIFS + TACK + MPD (3)
where MPD is the maximum propagation delay 3. So, the
Tvalide must be less than TOut2, otherwise the sender can
detect the problem and retransmit the packet.
Fig. 5. The false packet validation flow chart
Figure 5 illustrates the flow chart of the false packet’s
validation based on the false ACK attack. When the attacker
overhears the RTS packet, it determines the transmitter’s and
the receiver’s address an then waits for the CTS packet for
maximum T1. T1 is defined by the TSIFS time, the propaga-
tion time of CTS packet (TCTS) and the maximum propagation
delay (MPD), T1 = TSIFS+TCTS+MPD. Once the attacker
overhears the CTS packet before T1 timer finished, then, it
cancels the T1’s timer and it selects the Tcoll and Tvalidate as
illustrated above. Otherwise, it restarts the attacks’s algorithm.
Once the Tcoll timer is finished, the attacker sends the packet to
node D in order to create a collision. Then, then the Tvalidate
timer is finished the attacker send the false ACK to the sender
in order to validate the DATA packet transmission.
3In the IEEE 802.11 with the direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), the
MPD = 2us
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BY SIMULATION AND
EXPERIMENTATION
A. Attacks’ simulation and impact’s evaluation
In this section, we investigate on the impact of the false
CTS and false ACK (false validation) on the network. We
implemented these attacks in an NS2 [12] and we simulated
them in different cases.
First, we simulate the simple topology illustrated in figure 6.
In this scenario, we have two sets of nodes, S1 = {0, 1, 2, 3}
and S2 = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. In each set, the nodes can hear and
communicate directly with nodes belonging to the same set
but the nodes in S1 are not reachable by the nodes in S2 and
vice versa. In both sets, we have two CBR flows (the packet’s
size equals 1000 bytes and the rate reaches 50 packets/second).
However, in set S1, there is no attacker and in set S2 ; node
8 reacts as a malicious node and it can use the false CTS and
false packet validation’s attacks (false ACK).
Fig. 6. Simple topology
We chose the throughput as metric, in order to show the
impact of these attacks on the network. In figure 7, we
plot the average throughput of the network according to the
simulation time. In the case of the false ACK, we remark a
significant difference between a throughput with no attacker
in the network and one with one attacker in the network.
However, in the case of a false CTS, we note the same
observation as in the first case: the throughput decreases with
the attendance of the attacker in the network. However, the
false ACK has a more negative impact on the throughput than
the false CTS, because the false CTS just creates a blocking
situation for a certain time around the attacker node, whereas
the false ACK attack creates a collision at the receiver node
and then sends the false ACK packet, in order to get the packet
validated by the sender node and to avoid the retransmission.
In order to compare both attacks, we can say that the false
ACK attack is more complex to implement than the false CTS,
and the false ACK has a more negative impact on the network
than the false CTS.
In order to study the impact of these attacks in the general
case, we simulate a network with 50 nodes uniformly and
randomly distributed in the area of 800×800m2 with 25 CBR
connections and with a different number of attacker nodes
in the network. Figures 8 and 9 show the throughput in the
normal case and in the case of 10 and 20 attackers in the
network with both cases false ACK and false CTS. We note
that, when the number of attackers increases, the throughput
quickly decreases. However, the case of false CTS is illustrated
in figure 9, and we remark some difference with the case of
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Fig. 7. The average throughput versus time
false ACK: the throughput decreases less rapidly when we
introduce 10 and 20 attacker nodes. The difference in the case
of 10 and 20 attackers is not significant if we compare it with
the case of false ACK. In figure 10, we illustrate the impact
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Fig. 8. The throughput versus time with false ACK
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Fig. 9. The throughput versus time with false CTS
of the different numbers of attackers from 0 to 25 malicious
nodes (corresponding to 0 to 50%) in the network with a
simulation time of 150 seconds. In the case of 5 attackers in
the network, we note that the throughput decreases in the same
way in both cases false ACK and false CTS. However, when
the number of attackers is 10, we note that the throughput
of the network decreases more than in the case of false CTS.
We have the same observation when the number of attackers is
between 15 and 25. We can summarize as follows: the number
of false ACK attackers has a more negative impact than the
number of false CTS attackers.
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Fig. 10. The impact of the attackers number on throughput
B. Real attacks’ experimentation and their impacts
In order to illustrate the feasibility to exploit the described
vulnerabilities, we decided to realize these attacks and ex-
perimented them. To reach this goal, we experienced the
simple attack scenario by using the open source MadWifi
drivers (Multiband Atheros Driver for Wireless Fidelity) [9]
available for Linux. For compatibility with MadWifi, we used
wireless network interface cards based on the Atheros chipsets
[10]. For experimentation’ equipments, we used the Atheros
AR5005G 802.11abg NIC Chipset of TP-Link as wireless
network interface and Intel Pentium 4 2.4GHz, 512KB cache
L2 and 512MB of RAM memory for attacker and others
computers. Furthermore, the CTS and RTS attacks algorithms
are implemented on MadWifi. In figure 11, we show the simple
experimentation scenario, where the machines A and B want
to communicate and M is a malicious machine.
Fig. 11. Experimentation scenario
1) Case of false CTS attack: Node A is repeatedly trying
to ping node B (by using or not the RTS/CTS mechanism).
The ping process consists in two ICMP messages: a request
from A and a reply from B. After a successfully request/reply
message from A to B, node M overhears the communication
and obtains the transmission duration (NAV), and then, it
starts to manage its attack. Once, the channel is idle, it sends
a false CTS packet with NAV (CTS) in the duration field
as described in CTS attack’s algorithm. The NAV (CTS)
can be either a constant or a random value, but it cannot
exceed 32767µSec [8]. Using the analyzer Wireshark [11]
to listen and monitor the network traffic, we obtained result
which is plotted in figure 12. We notice that after the first
successful communication between nodes A and B, node M
starts its attacks at 30 seconds and it successfully sends a
false CTS. Then, we remark that neither node A nor node
B can communicate during false NAV (CTS). The attacker
node M continues to transmit the false CTS and dominates the
channel by creating the blocking situation. We focus on the
period between 30 and 35 seconds and we plot in figure 12
the number of packets according to experience times. Then,
we illustrate that the first false CTS packet is transmitted and
after false NAV duration, others false CTS are transmitted by
the attacker in order to keep the blocking situation as long
as possible. When attacker M stops to send the false CTS at
320 seconds, node A can send its packet to node B and the
channel’s situation is back to normal.
Fig. 12. Impact of false CTS attacks on ICMP message between A and B
In order to study the false CTS attack with TCP commu-
nication, we introduced the SSH connection between nodes
A and B. Figure 13 shows the result obtained by using the
Wireshark analyzer in the case of the SSH connection. The
SSH connection is represented by TCP flows in figure 13.
We remark that when the attacker manages to have access to
the channel and successfully sends the false CTS packet at
39 seconds, then the communication between nodes A and
B is broken during the false NAV. Since, the attacker can
transmit successfully the false CTS and it continues to disturb
the communication between nodes. With these results, we
illustrate the efficiency of the false CTS attack and its real
negative impact in the network.
Fig. 13. Impact of false CTS attacks on SSH connection between A and B
2) Case of false RTS attack: In order to illustrate the impact
of the false RTS by the experimentation, we implemented
this attack with MadWifi and the results obtained are shown
in figure 14. We notice that when the attacker success to
transmit the false RTS, it blocks nodes A and B for the random
NAV (RTS) chosen by the attacker. At 68.5 seconds node A
success to access to the channel but few after node M success
to send its false RTS and blocks again the nodes A and B.
The attacker M is in competition with nodes A and B to
transmit the false RTS. In comparison between the results of
false RTS and false CTS attacks, we remark that the false
CTS has more negative impact than the false RTS, because
the collision with CTS packet is less than the collision with
RTS packet. However the CTS packet’ size is 38 bytes and it
is smaller than the RTS packet’s size which is 44 bytes. As
conclusion, we can say that the false CTS is more efficient
and difficult to detect than the false RTS attack.
Fig. 14. Impact of false RTS attacks on ICMP message between A and B
According to the experimentation’s results, we illustrated
the feasibility of implement these attacks and study their real
impact on the network. Furthermore, we plan to extend this
experimental platform to more complex scenarios.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The design of the detection and the reaction mechanisms
against described attacks without modification of IEEE 802.11
standard is a real challenge. The problem is related to the
vulnerability of the CTS and ACK packets’ format. Further-
more, these attacks have a negative impact on the network. For
instance, with a false packet validation, the routing protocol
can easily be disturbed: the nodes cannot establish the routing
table. Another important negative impact of the false packet
validation attack is that it disturbs the monitoring process.
The problem with the false CTS and false ACK, is that the
attacker does not need to spoof the source address, because
the conception of these packets does not require the source
address. In addition, the attacker can easily escape the pun-
ishment procedure and continue its attack frequently. Unlike
the false RTS attack, the attacker creates a false RTS in order
to create the virtual jamming. In this case, the jammer can
be detected by the IDS and reduces the effect of its attack.
The random RTS validation is proposed by Ashikur [7] to
alleviate the impact of this attack. If the attacker chooses the
false RTS attack, it needs to spoof the source address in the
RTS packet sent by the victim node’s address, in order to
escape the punishment reaction of the IDS.
Every of false CTS and false ACK can create suspicion
situations, each node in the attacker’s transmission range
suspects other nodes in its transmission range. In order to
avoid any false RTS, false CTS and false ACK (or false
validation packet), we need to answer the following question.
How authenticate and check the integrity of the control packets
such as: RTS, CTS and ACK? Many answers and solutions
with and without cryptography concept can be proposed to
deal with this problem. However, the investigation of the trade-
off between the security cost of the secure control packets and
the quality of service (QoS) is needful which is the extension
of this work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown some new hidden vulnerabili-
ties in IEEE 802.11 and the possible attacks that could exploit
them. These vulnerabilities at the MAC layer are analysed,
like the false CTS and false packet validation attacks which
exploit the CTS and ACK packets format vulnerability. The
negative impacts of these attacks on the network are illustrated
by the analytical, simulation’s and experimentation’s results.
Another important negative effect of the false validation packet
based on the false ACK attack affects not only the the network
performance but also the monitoring process. The attacker
can easily reduce the reputation of well-behavioring nodes
and disturb the existing trust model. Furthermore, the routing
operation can be dramatically affected by the false ACK attack
or false packet validation. The real implementation of these
attacks particularly false RTS and false CTS demonstrate the
feasibility to exploit the vulnerabilities on IEEE 802.11.
As future work, we plan to study some efficient solutions
with and without cryptography concept and their security cost
estimation including energy consumption and throughput.
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